Output gap uncertainty and real-time monetary policy  by Grigoli, Francesco et al.
Russian Journal of Economics 1 (2015) 329–358
Available online at www.sciencedirect.com 
www.rujec.org
Output gap uncertainty  
and real-time monetary policy
Francesco Grigoli*, Alexander Herman,  
Andrew Swiston, Gabriel Di Bella
International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC, United States
Abstract
Output gap estimates are subject to a wide range of uncertainty owing principally 
WR WKHGLI¿FXOW\ LQ GLVWLQJXLVKLQJEHWZHHQ F\FOH DQG WUHQG LQ UHDO WLPH:H VKRZ WKDW
country desks tend to overestimate economic slack, especially during recessions, and 
that uncertainty in initial output gap estimates persists several years. Only a small share 
of output gap revisions is predictable based on output dynamics, data quality, and policy 
IUDPHZRUNV:HDOVRVKRZWKDWIRUDJURXSRI/DWLQ$PHULFDQLQÀDWLRQWDUJHWHUVWKHSUH-
scriptions from monetary policy rules are subject to large changes due to revised output 
JDSHVWLPDWHV7KHVHH[SODLQDVL]DEOHSURSRUWLRQRIWKHGHYLDWLRQRILQÀDWLRQIURPWDUJHW
suggesting this information is not accounted for in real-time policy decisions.
1RQSUR¿WSDUWQHUVKLS³9RSURV\(NRQRPLNL´+RVWLQJE\(OVHYLHU%9$OOULJKWV
reserved.
-(/FODVVL¿FDWLRQ E01, E32, E43, E52




 —  Caroline Baum, Bloomberg, April 12, 2010
1. Introduction
Output gap measures are used as if they were essential and reliable for as-
VHVVLQJPDFURHFRQRPLFSROLFLHV%RWK¿VFDODQGPRQHWDU\SROLF\UHDFWLRQIXQF-
tions use output gap estimates as an input in assessing the appropriate settings for 







¿VFDO DQGPRQHWDU\ DXWKRULWLHV DQDO\]H DZLGHYDULHW\RI LQGLFDWRUV LQ DVVHVV-
ing the cyclical position of the economy (including deviations of unemployment 
from its natural rate), they frequently resort to the output gap to summarize their 
assessment of economy-wide spare capacity.
Despite being widely used to formulate policy recommendations, initial output 
gap estimates are characterized by large uncertainty. This has been extensively docu-
mented in the literature. For instance, Orphanides and van Norden (2002) show how 
UHDOWLPHHVWLPDWHVRIWKH86RXWSXWJDSKDYHRIWHQSURYHQKLJKO\LQDFFXUDWH/H\
and Misch (2013) highlight this phenomenon across a broad range of countries. In 
DVRPHZKDWUHODWHGIDVKLRQ+RDQG0DXUR¿QGWKDWORQJWHUPJURZWKIRUH-
FDVWVVXIIHUIURP³RSWLPLVPELDV´LQSDUWLFXODUIRUFRXQWULHVZKRVHUHFHQWJURZWK
has been below trend. Uncertainty as to the position of the economy in the cycle was 
SDUWLFXODUO\LPSRUWDQWDWWKHWLPHRIWKHJOREDO¿QDQFLDOFULVLV)RULQVWDQFHWKHVL]H
of the output gap in the United States has been repeatedly reassessed after 2007, 
JLYHQWKHODUJHXQFHUWDLQW\RQWKHLPSDFWRIWKH¿QDQFLDOFULVLVRQSRWHQWLDORXWSXW
(IMF, 2010). Needless to say, this uncertainty has important policy implications and 
FDQOHDGWRGLI¿FXOWLHVLQVHWWLQJDSROLF\WKDWLVDSSURSULDWHJLYHQWKHWUXHVWDWHRI
the economy. This topic has become particularly important for emerging markets, 
LQFOXGLQJPDQ\LQ/DWLQ$PHULFD7KLVLVWKHFDVHDVGXULQJWKHODVWGHFDGHPDQ\
of these countries have transitioned toward rule-based monetary policy frameworks. 
This paper revisits the issue of output gap uncertainty by analyzing properties and 
determinants of real-time output gap estimates from different sources for the period 
1990–2014. It focuses on the changes in output gap estimates that arise due to ex-
post GDP data revisions and changes in the decomposition of actual GDP data into 
its cyclical and trend components. It empirically assesses whether real-time data 
can predict how much the output gap will be revised later. The paper then analyzes 
WKHLPSOLFDWLRQVRIRXWSXWJDSXQFHUWDLQW\IRU¿YH/DWLQ$PHULFDQHFRQRPLHVWKDW
KDYHLPSOHPHQWHGLQÀDWLRQWDUJHWLQJRYHUWKHODVWGHFDGH2XUUHVXOWVVXJJHVWWKDW
real-time estimates of output gap are highly unreliable. In particular, country desks 
tend to overstate economic slack. In addition, we show that revisions are substan-
tial (especially during recessions), persistent, and, to a large extent, unpredictable. 
)LQDOO\ZH¿QGWKDWUHYLVLRQVKHOSWRH[SODLQGHYLDWLRQVRILQÀDWLRQIURPWKHWDUJHW
suggesting that this information is not accounted for in real-time policy decisions. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 examines the statistical properties 
of output gap estimates and their revisions in order to quantify the uncertain-
ty that surrounds initial estimates of the output gap. Section 3 looks at whether 
WKHVHUHYLVLRQVFDQEHSUHGLFWHGEDVHGHLWKHURQFRXQWU\VSHFL¿FFKDUDFWHULVWLFV
or the country’s position in the business cycle at the time of the initial estimate. 
6HFWLRQ  LOOXVWUDWHV WKHSROLF\ LPSOLFDWLRQV RI RXWSXW JDS XQFHUWDLQW\ RQ ¿YH
/DWLQ$PHULFDQHFRQRPLHVWKDWKDYHRSHUDWHGZLWKLQÀDWLRQWDUJHWLQJVFKHPHV
during the last decade. Section 5 concludes.
2. Output gap revisions
This section examines the statistical properties of output gap estimates and 
WKHLUUHYLVLRQVLQRUGHUWRHYDOXDWHWKHGHJUHHRIFRQ¿GHQFHWKDWFDQEHDWWDFKHG
to initial assessments of an economy’s cyclical position. 
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 2XWSXWJDSGH¿QLWLRQDQGGDWD
The output gap is an unobserved, estimated concept, and therefore not known 
ZLWKFHUWDLQW\ ,W LVGH¿QHGDV WKHGHYLDWLRQRIDFWXDO IURPSRWHQWLDORXWSXWDV
a percent of potential. In equation (1) below, y denotes actual output (measured 
by real GDP) and y* UHSUHVHQWVSRWHQWLDORXWSXWZKLFKLVGH¿QHGDVWKHRXWSXW
an economy could produce if all factors of production were operating at their full 
employment rates of capacity. The output gap is denoted by \Ǧ :
\Ǧ  = 
( y  –  y*)
y*   100 (1)
A negative (positive) sign for the output gap indicates that output is below (above) 
SRWHQWLDO(VWLPDWHVRISRWHQWLDORXWSXWDUHKHDYLO\LQÀXHQFHGE\WKHDYHUDJHOHYHO
of an economy’s production over time. Revisions to the initial estimate of the out-
put gap could occur as subsequent developments change estimates of the econo-
my’s productive capacity in previous periods. 
Table 1 shows the possible sources of deviations of initial estimates of 
WKHRXWSXWJDSFRPSDUHGWRWKHLU¿QDOHVWLPDWHV/HWt denote the period under 
analysis. Estimates made before or during year tDUHIRUHFDVWV7KH¿UVWHVWLPDWH
in which data for year t is known is called the initial estimate, and subsequent 
HVWLPDWHVXQWLOWKH¿QDOHVWLPDWHDUHFDOOHGUHYLVHGHVWLPDWHV1 Evaluating revi-
sions to initial estimates requires a decision on which subsequent vintage will 
VHUYHDV WKH¿QDO HVWLPDWH7KLVSDSHUXVHV DV WKH¿QDO HVWLPDWH WKHHVWLPDWHG
output gap seven years after the period in question, as revisions typically level 
off within seven years. This picks up revisions to the output gap at business 
cycle frequencies. 
$V VKRZQ LQ7DEOH  GHYLDWLRQV EHWZHHQ WKHIRUHFDVW DQG¿QDO HVWLPDWH RI
WKHRXWSXWJDSFDQFRPHIURPIRXUSRVVLEOHVRXUFHV7KH¿UVWLVWKDWWKHIRUHFDVW
serves as an input into the policymaker’s reaction function. If policymakers base 
their decisions in part on the forecast and policy affects output within the year, it 
is to be expected that the outturn will differ from the forecast. A second source 
of uncertainty is forecast error; factors other than policy could cause the realized 
output gap to differ from the forecast, and even if policy is implemented as pro-
jected, its effects could differ from what was forecast. 
This paper focuses on the third and fourth sources — revisions to the output 
gap arising from data revisions and those arising from changing the decompo-
sition of actual data into its cyclical and trend components. These sources are 
 1 An annual frequency is assumed but the principles translate to any frequency.
Table 1
Sources of revisions to output gap estimates.
9LQWDJHRIHVWLPDWH Descriptor 3RVVLEOHVRXUFHVRIGHYLDWLRQVIURP¿QDO
t Forecast Policy reactions, forecast error, data revisions, 
uncertainty over potential output
t + 1 Initial estimate Data revisions, uncertainty over potential output
t + 2 ... t + 6 Revised estimates Data revisions, uncertainty over potential output
t + 7 Final estimate 1RQHE\GH¿QLWLRQ
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present in forecasts and in all ex-postHVWLPDWHVXQWLOWKH¿QDOHVWLPDWHDVGDWDDUH
revised and estimates of potential output take into account both data revisions for 
period t and developments in subsequent periods. 
This study will be restricted entirely to ex-post estimates  —  those made after 
data for the period under study has been released — in order to isolate the impact 
of data revisions and potential output uncertainty and ensure that deviations re-
ODWHGWRSROLF\UHDFWLRQVDQGIRUHFDVWHUURUGRQRWDIIHFWWKH¿QGLQJV0RGHOLQJ
the real-time impact of policy reactions and deviations arising from forecast er-
rors are outside the scope of the analysis.
This paper uses data and forecasts from the International Monetary Fund’s 
(IMF) World Economic Outlook:(2UHOHDVHGWZLFHD\HDULQWKHVSULQJDQG
WKHIDOO7KH:(2GDWDEDVHFRQVLVWVRIPDFURHFRQRPLFGDWDDQGIRUHFDVWVVXE-
mitted by country teams and vetted by the IMF’s Research Department for both 
internal and multilateral consistency. There is no prescribed estimation methodo-
logy, but the estimates are used by the IMF in discussions with country authori-
ties over appropriate economic policies, underscoring the importance of an ac-
curate assessment. 
Given the importance of working only with ex-post estimates, the vintage 
IURPZKLFK WRGUDZWKHGDWD LVFULWLFDO7KHVSULQJ:(2ZDVUHOHDVHG LQ0D\
up through 2001 and in April thereafter; the fall version is typically released in 
October, and occasionally in September. Given the production lags, forecasts for 
the spring publication are performed during February or March. Given this time-
OLQHLQWKHVSULQJ:(2UHDO*'3GDWDIRUWKHSUHYLRXV\HDUZLOOFRQWLQXHWREHDQ
estimate or forecast for some countries. For this reason, the analysis is performed 
with the fall vintages. 
'DWDDUHDYDLODEOHVLQFH*LYHQWKDWWKH¿QDOHVWLPDWHRIWKHRXWSXWJDS
LVWKDWPHDVXUHGVHYHQ\HDUVDIWHUWKHSHULRGLQTXHVWLRQWKHDYDLODEOH:(2YLQ-
tages allow the calculation of initial estimates and subsequent revisions up to 
WKH¿QDOHVWLPDWHIURPWR7KH:(2GDWDEDVHFRQWDLQVUHDOWLPHHV-
timates of the output gap made by country desks for many advanced economies 
throughout this period. Estimates for many other economies, however, begin only 
in 2008. 
In order to cover as many countries as possible, we estimate output gaps 
XVLQJSRWHQWLDO*'3REWDLQHGE\DSSO\LQJWKH+RGULFN3UHVFRWW+3¿OWHURQ
UHDO*'3GDWD IURP WKH:(2DQGFRPSDUHZLWK WKHHVWLPDWHV IURPFRXQWU\
desks where available. As shown in Table 2, we formally test which size of 
the smoothing parameter Ȝ commonly used for annual data (100 and 6.25) 






(Ȝ = 100) (Ȝ = 6.25) (Ȝ = 100) (Ȝ = 6.25)
2EVHUYHG:(2GDWD 2.11 2.25 0.47 0.40
Observed OECD data 1.10 1.47 0.72 0.51
6RXUFH Authors’ calculations.
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data.2 Table 3 reports the root mean squared errors (RMSE) and R-squared values 
below, suggesting that ȜVHWWRLVDEHWWHUDQDORJRIERWK:(2DQG2(&'
data. This suggests that country desks tend to interpret changes in real GDP as 
changes in cycle rather than in trend. Thus, in the analysis that follows we use 
+3¿OWHUHGGDWDZLWKȜ set to 100 for all countries while performing robustness 
FKHFNVRQWKHUHVXOWVXVLQJWKHGHVNSURYLGHGHVWLPDWHVDQG+3¿OWHUHGGDWDZLWK
Ȝ set to 6.25.3 Thus, the baseline dataset has an average sample size of 176 coun-
tries per year, for a total of 3,018 observations, which should replicate the statisti-
cal properties of the estimates used by the IMF for policy recommendations.
2.2. Initial estimates and revisions
Initial assessments of an economy’s cyclical position are subject to a high de-
gree of uncertainty. Table 3 shows that revisions to the output gap are of the same 
order of magnitude as the initial estimates of the output gap itself, and that 
about one-third of economies have an output gap that changes signs between 
WKHLQLWLDODQG¿QDOHVWLPDWHV&RXQWULHVDUHGLYLGHGLQWRWKUHHJURXSVWRHYDOXDWH
whether there are differences across types of country. Advanced economies in-
FOXGHDOO2(&'PHPEHUVDVRIWKHEHJLQQLQJRIWKHVDPSOH/RZLQFRPH
economies include any country with a GNI per capita of $1,045 or less in 2012. 
Emerging economies are all those that are not included in the other two groups.4 
Revisions for emerging and low-income economies are larger than those for ad-
vanced economies and the estimates are more likely to switch signs. All these 
IHDWXUHVRIWKHGDWDFRQ¿UPWKH¿QGLQJVRI/H\DQG0LVFK
Uncertainty over the output gap persists for several years after the period un-
der analysis. Fig. 1 shows the absolute value of marginal output gap revisions in 
each vintage and at various percentiles. In the year following the initial estimate, 
the output gap of the typical country is revised by 0.9 percentage points. Two 
years later, the absolute value of the median revision remains nearly half a per-
centage point. Seven years after the year under analysis, a quarter of all countries 
experience revisions of half a percentage point and ten percent of all countries 
experience an output gap revision of a full percentage point. 
 2 As noted in Baxter and King (1995), setting Ȝ to 10 or below closely replicates the statistical properties of 
WKH%D[WHU.LQJ¿OWHU
 3 :HUXQWKH+3¿OWHURYHUDOODYDLODEOHKLVWRULFDOGDWDSOXV WKHIRUHFDVWDYDLODEOH LQ WKH:(2GDWDEDVHWR
mitigate endpoint problems.
 4 See Appendix A for a complete list of countries in each group.
Table 3
Output gap: Initial estimates and revisions (percent of potential GDP).
Number of 
countries









All countries 176 –0.97 5.12 –0.22 5.57 0.75 3.89 32.3
Advanced 24 –0.24 1.61 0.27 2.49 0.51 1.67 22.9
Emerging 122 –0.98 5.47 –0.34 5.90 0.64 4.11 32.7
/RZLQFRPH 30 –1.77 5.28 –0.22 5.93 1.55 4.16 38.8
6RXUFH Authors’ calculations.
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In addition, initial assessments of the cyclical position overestimate the amount 
of slack in the economy. Actual output is 1.0 percent below potential output in 
LQLWLDO HVWLPDWHV EXW RQO\  SHUFHQW EHORZ SRWHQWLDO LQ ¿QDO HVWLPDWHV DQG
 median revisions to the output gap exceed 0.5 percent of potential for all types 
RI FRXQWULHV 7DEOH  )LJ  OHIW SDQHO:H FDOO WKLV SKHQRPHQRQ ³H[FHVV 
FDSDFLW\ELDV´
Two factors interact to produce excess capacity bias. First, initial estimates of 
economic activity tended to be revised upward in later vintages (Fig. 2, middle 
panel). This fact by itself would not lead to a bias towards excess capacity, as 
persistent upward data revisions would tend to raise both actual and potential 
output without a substantial impact on the estimated cyclical position. However, 
HFRQRPLFDFWLYLW\WHQGHGWRXQGHUSHUIRUP,0)IRUHFDVWVLQOLQHZLWKWKH¿QGLQJV
of Ho and Mauro (2014) and Timmermann (2007). This second factor worked to 
keep cumulative revisions to estimated potential growth roughly neutral, at less 
than 0.1 percent of potential output, on average (Fig. 2, right panel). The com-
bination of upward revisions to past activity and downward revisions to current 
activity (relative to the forecast) results in the lower level of excess capacity in 
¿QDOHVWLPDWHVFRPSDUHGWRLQLWLDOHVWLPDWHV






Initial assessments of an economy’s cyclical position are least reliable during 
recessions. Fig. 3 compares the full sample and a subsample restricted to epi-
sodes in which the initial estimate of real GDP growth was negative, displaying 
for each group of observations the average absolute revision and the standard 
deviation of revisions.5 It shows that absolute revisions to the output gap, actual 
growth, and potential growth are 30 to 50 percent larger during downturns than in 
normal times, and the wider distribution of revisions — 30 percent higher than in 
the full sample — highlights the additional uncertainty over the cyclical position 
of an economy when growth is negative. 
2.3. Robustness checks
The key features of initial assessments of an economy’s cyclical position and its 
subsequent revisions are 1) a high degree of uncertainty that persists several years 
beyond the period under analysis; 2) initial estimates have an excess capacity bias, 
overestimating the amount of spare capacity in an economy; and 3) increased un-
certainty around cyclical turning points, in particular during economic downturns.
,QRUGHUWRHQVXUHWKDWWKHVHIHDWXUHVRIWKHGDWDDUHQRWXQLTXHWRWKH:(2
GDWDVHWRURXUXVHRIWKH+3¿OWHUWRHVWLPDWHSRWHQWLDORXWSXWDQGWKHRXWSXWJDS
we perform several robustness checks. 
)LUVWZHXVH+3¿OWHUHGGDWDJHQHUDWHGE\VHWWLQJȜ equal to 6.25.6 The me-
dian revisions are much lower than those when Ȝ is set to 100, suggesting that 
the excess capacity bias depends on the parameter Ȝ, and therefore on the extent 
WRZKLFKUHDOJURZWKÀXFWXDWLRQVDUHLQWHUSUHWHGDVVWUXFWXUDO+RZHYHUWKHUD-
tios of standard deviations to medians are dramatically larger. This suggests that 
 5 Clearly, turning points marking an acceleration of an economy could also be analyzed. Given that potential 
growth rates differ across economies, negative real GDP growth (especially at the annual frequency) may not 
catch all cyclical turning points, but it is probable that most observations in this subsample are turning points 
(with the most likely exception being economies in an extended period of negative growth). The results hold 
ZKHQQHJDWLYHJURZWKLVGH¿QHGXVLQJWKH¿QDOHVWLPDWHUDWKHUWKDQWKHLQLWLDOHVWLPDWH





using Ȝ set to 6.25 creates higher levels of normalized volatility in output gap 
measurements and more evenly dispersed revisions across zero, implying an even 
higher uncertainty about the direction of the revision. 
Second, we use estimates of the output gap from two cross-country sources: 
the OECD’s Economic Outlook GDWDEDVHDQGWKH:(2GDWDEDVH7KH'HFHPEHU
edition of the Economic Outlook was used, as its release coincides most closely 
ZLWKWKH)DOO:(2$VZLWKWKH:(2HVWLPDWHVWKH2(&'HVWLPDWHVDUHVXEPLW-
ted directly by country teams using their own judgment as to the amount of spare 
capacity in each economy. Using estimates that rely on the judgment of analysts 
FRYHULQJWKHHFRQRPLHVLQTXHVWLRQVKRXOGUHYHDOZKHWKHUWKHXVHRIWKH+3¿OWHU
is driving the results. 
%RWKWKH:(2DQG2(&'GDWDFRYHUPRVWO\DGYDQFHGHFRQRPLHVVR)LJ
FRPSDUHV WKHNH\ PHWULFV SUHVHQWHG DERYH ZLWK WKH+3¿OWHUHG HVWLPDWHV DOO
using the same sample of advanced economies (see Appendix A). Country desks’ 
estimates display at least as much persistent uncertainty in revisions and excess 
FDSDFLW\ELDVDVWKH+3¿OWHUHGHVWLPDWHV,QIDFWWKHULJKWSDQHOLQ)LJVKRZV
that the typical revisions from these sources are larger and more variable than 
WKRVHIURPWKH+3¿OWHUHGGDWD
Third, for the United States we analyze output gap estimates based on a pro-
GXFWLRQIXQFWLRQDSSURDFKSXEOLVKHGE\WKH&RQJUHVVLRQDO%XGJHW2I¿FH&%2
see CBO, 2001, for a description of the methodology) in addition to the sources 
PHQWLRQHGDERYH)LJVKRZVWKDW&%2DQG+3¿OWHUHGHVWLPDWHVVKRZVLPL-
lar persistent uncertainty, while the distribution of revisions is slightly less wide 
using CBO estimates, although this may in part be due to the later timing of the 




SXEOLVKHG WKHSUHFHGLQJ 6HSWHPEHU2FWREHU DQG 'HFHPEHU UHVSHFWLYHO\ VXFK WKDW WKH¿UVW UHWURVSHFWLYH
estimate of the output gap in year t is assumed to be made in January of year t + 2; revisions are then made until 
WKH¿QDOHVWLPDWHLQ\HDUt + 8.
 






ing the forecast are even more volatile and subject to revision than those with 
the forecast included. Finally, the results are insensitive to changing the vintage 
IRUWKH¿QDOHVWLPDWHWRVL[RUHLJKW\HDUVUDWKHUWKDQVHYHQ
Overall, these results underscore the challenges facing policymakers when set-
ting policy based on assessments of an economy’s cyclical position. Assessments 
made at the time of policy decisions are likely to be revised substantially in 
subsequent periods, and they likely overstate the degree of excess capacity in 
the economy. In addition, there is evidence these problems are more acute during 
turning points, as revisions tend to be larger during recessions.
3. Determinants of output gap revisions
The previous section establishes the wide range of uncertainty that sur-
rounds initial estimates of the output gap. This section looks at whether output 
JDS UHYLVLRQV FDQEH SUHGLFWHGEDVHGRQ HLWKHU FRXQWU\VSHFL¿F FKDUDFWHULVWLFV
or the country’s position in the business cycle at the time of the initial estimate. 
$OWKRXJKZH¿QGVHYHUDOVLJQL¿FDQWGHWHUPLQDQWVRIRXWSXWJDSUHYLVLRQVDODUJH
share of revisions remains unexplained, suggesting that they may not be predict-
able at the time policy decisions are made.
3.1. Empirical strategy
Some variables may explain the direction of subsequent output gap revisions, 
while others may only be informative about the magnitude of revisions. In order 
to maximize the explanatory power of the information at our disposal at the time 
of initial estimates, we attempt to explain the size of output gap revisions rath-
 8 5HVXOWVIRUVXEVDPSOHVDUHQRWVKRZQVLQFHWKH\DUHYHU\VLPLODUWRWKHEDVHOLQHVSHFL¿FDWLRQEXWWKH\DUH
available from the authors upon request.
 
Fig. 5. Comparison across U.S. output gap estimates
6RXUFH Authors’ calculations.
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er than the direction in which the revisions occur.9 /HW _\Ǧ i,t | t +1  –  \Ǧ i,t | t +7 _ GHQRWH
the abso lute value of the cumulative output gap revision for country i at time t. 
This can be modeled as:
_\Ǧ i,t | t +1  –  \Ǧ i,t | t +7 _ Į  +  ȕ Xi,t | t +1  +  į Di  +  İit (2)
where Į is the intercept, Xi,t | t +1 is a matrix of variables including the set of co-
variates for country i at time t and measured at time t +1, Di is a matrix including 
other time-invariant covariates measured at the most recent point in time, ȕ and 
įDUHWKHFRHI¿FLHQWVRQWKHVHPDWULFHVDQGİit is a mean zero error term that cap-
tures unexplained heterogeneity.
(TXDWLRQ  LV HVWLPDWHG XVLQJ RUGLQDU\ OHDVW VTXDUHV 2/6 DSSOLHG WR
a pooled panel sample of annual observations, correcting the standard errors for 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. As a robustness check, we also estimate 
equation (2) with a further correction of the standard errors for cross-sectional 
dependence. 
The selection of the control variables Xi,t | t +1 and DiLQFOXGHGLQWKHVSHFL¿FD-
tions relies on our understanding, guided by previous empirical research (see, in 
SDUWLFXODU/H\DQG0LVFKRIZKDWIDFWRUVPD\GHWHUPLQHWKHPDJQLWXGH
of the output gap revisions. 
,Q RUGHU WRPD[LPL]H WKHXVHIXOQHVV RI WKH¿QGLQJV WR SROLF\ GHFLVLRQVZH
also investigate the determinants of output gap revisions that are large enough to 
change the sign of the gap, since real-time assessments of whether the economy 
is above or below potential output play a key role in policy decisions. To in-
vestigate the determinants of changes in the sign of the output gap, we estimate 
the following population-averaged panel probit model10 on the same regressors 
DVLQWKHEDVHOLQHVSHFL¿FDWLRQ
ĭ  \ǦSi,t|(t +1, t +7) = 1) = Į  +  ȕ Xi,t | t +1  +  į Di  +  İit (3)
ZKHUHĭ LV WKHSUREDELOLW\ IXQFWLRQ DQG  \ǦSi,t | (t +1, t +7) is a binary variable taking 
the value one when the sign of the output gap of country i at time t measured 
at time t +7 is the opposite of the sign of the same output gap measured at time 
t +7RDYRLGPLOGÀXFWXDWLRQVDURXQGSRWHQWLDO*'3ZHFRQVLGHURQO\HSLVRGHV
in which the output gap revision is larger than half a percentage point of poten-
tial GDP. Our estimations perform a correction for heteroskedasticity and auto-
correlation of the standard errors.11 
 9 Note that the revisions of output gap estimates made ex ante would be even less predictable. See 
Appendix A for a detailed description of the variables. 
 10 The alternative is to use logit regressions, assuming an error term that is logistically distributed. As 
a robustness check, we perform logit regressions that are not shown because they return similar results. Results 
are available from the authors upon request.
 11 7KHHVWLPDWHGFRHI¿FLHQWVRIDSURELWPRGHOGRQRWTXDQWLI\WKHLQÀXHQFHRIWKHFRYDULDWHVRQWKHSUREDELOLW\
of a sign change of the output gap because they are parameters of the latent model. As such, they only measure 
the effect of a regressor on the latent propensity for a positive result. The effect of a unit change of a covariate on 
the dependent variable when the other covariates are constant is represented by the marginal effect. This can then 
EHLQWHUSUHWHGVLPLODUO\WRWKHOLQHDUUHJUHVVLRQFRHI¿FLHQWZKLFKGLUHFWO\PHDVXUHVWKHPDUJLQDOHIIHFWRIDQ




variables related to domestic or world GDP dynamics. In particular, we control 
for the size of the output gap measured at t +1. A very large positive or negative 
output gap may signal a change in trend growth that is incorporated only gradually 
into estimates of potential output and thus we expect a positive impact on the size 
of revisions. Also, we include domestic and world real GDP growth surprises in 
time t (measured at time t +WRKDYHDFWXDO¿JXUHVZKLFKDUHGH¿QHGDVWKHGH-
viation of domestic (or world) real GDP growth from its mean within the last 
10 years. Thus, when a surprise in growth occurs, either domestic or worldwide, 
LW LQFUHDVHV WKHGLI¿FXOW\RIGHFRPSRVLQJ DFWXDORXWSXWGDWD LQWR LWV WUHQG DQG
cyclical components, negatively affecting the ability to estimate the output gap 
and increasing the expected size of its revisions.
A second category of variables attempts to gauge macroeconomic uncertainty. 
To this end, we use the standard deviation of domestic real GDP growth over 




for structural changes in the economy.12 It is constructed as the sum of oil, natural 
gas, coal, mineral, and forest rents, which greatly depend on the corresponding 
price. Finally, we also include the most commonly used proxy for macroeconom-
LFXQFHUWDLQW\ZKLFKLVLQÀDWLRQ$OOWKHVHYDULDEOHVDUHH[SHFWHGWREHSRVLWLYHO\
associated with the size of revisions. 
A third category of variables captures the presence of policy frameworks. 
,QSDUWLFXODUZHLQFOXGHGXPP\YDULDEOHVIRUWKHSUHVHQFHRILQÀDWLRQWDUJH
WLQJDQG¿VFDOUXOHVWKDWDUHVSHFL¿HGLQWHUPVRIVRPH¿VFDODJJUHJDWHDGMXVW-
ed for the cycle (here we call them cyclical¿VFDOUXOHV7KHVHIUDPHZRUNV
should activate countercyclical policies which should help keep output rela-
tively near its trend level, reducing the size of revisions. Fiscal rules, howev-
HUDUHRIWHQLQWURGXFHGZKHQ¿VFDOGLVFLSOLQHLVZHDNDQGWKHLUDGRSWLRQFDQ
EH DFFRPSDQLHG E\ VLJQL¿FDQW DGMXVWPHQWV ZKHQ FRQGLWLRQV IRU WULJJHULQJ
escape clauses are not met. Thus, the expected effect on output gap revisions 
is ambiguous.
A last category of variables is supposed to capture the degree of statisti-
cal capacity common to different groups of countries. Advanced economies 
are likely to have good and timely data and thus revisions to actual data and 
the output gap are expected to be smaller. In contrast, data timeliness and avail-
DELOLW\ LV PRUH KHWHURJHQHRXV LQ ORZLQFRPH FRXQWULHV /,&V SRVVLEO\ DI-
fecting the reliability of initial releases of GDP data and increasing the size 
of output gap revisions. This is similar to what happens in a number of small 
economies (those with a population below the 10th percentile of the population 
GLVWULEXWLRQ%H\RQGGDWDTXDOLW\/,&VDQGVPDOOHFRQRPLHVPD\EHVXEMHFW
to shocks (such as natural disasters) whose effects are hard to decompose be-
tween the trend and the cycle in real time. These three factors are represented 
by dummy variables.
 12 Since there are no vintages available for rents in percent of GDP, we assume that the data are the same as at 
time t + 8.
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3.2. Results
Table 4 presents evidence on the determinants of the cumulative absolute re-
YLVLRQV RI WKHRXWSXW JDS:H UXQ WKHEDVHOLQH VSHFL¿FDWLRQ RQ DQ XQEDODQFHG
sample of 2,943 observations for 171 countries over the period 1990–2007 using 
WKHEDVHOLQHGDWDVHWRI+3¿OWHUHG UHDO*'3GDWD)RU UREXVWQHVVZHHVWLPDWH
WKHVDPHVSHFL¿FDWLRQXVLQJHVWLPDWHVIRUWKHRXWSXWJDSSURYLGHGWRWKH:(2
by country desks, as well as OECD estimates, and by running an alternate speci-




2(&' HVWLPDWHV WKHGXPP\ YDULDEOHV IRU 2(&' FRXQWULHV /,&V DQG VPDOO
economies are no longer applicable.
Table 4
Determinants of the absolute revisions of the output gap, baseline  
(dependent variable: absolute revisions of the output gap at t + 7 compared to t + 1).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
+3¿OWHUHG:(2GDWD :(2GDWD OECD data
2/6 2/63&6( 2/6 2/63&6( 2/6 2/63&6(
Abs. output gap # 0.109*** 0.104*** 0.658*** 0.613*** 0.180*** 0.134
(0.035) (0.022) (0.161) (0.070) (0.040) (0.083)
Abs. real GDP growth 
surprise #
0.074*** 0.049*** –0.035 –0.026 0.043 0.034
(0.014) (0.018) (0.069) (0.057) (0.083) (0.089)
Abs. world real GDP 
growth surprise #
0.189** 0.085 0.801*** 0.568*** 0.925*** 0.612***
(0.077) (0.065) (0.142) (0.125) (0.188) (0.138)
Real GDP growth SD # 0.005 0.008 –0.014 –0.047 –0.019 –0.005
(0.020) (0.028) (0.071) (0.085) (0.139) (0.152)
Rents/GDP 0.020*** 0.021*** –0.002 –0.007 –0.054*** –0.056**
(0.007) (0.006) (0.016) (0.036) (0.013) (0.023)
,QÀDWLRQ 0.009 0.009* –0.061 –0.039 0.114** 0.119
(0.007) (0.005) (0.060) (0.044) (0.055) (0.075)
,QÀDWLRQWDUJHWLQJ –0.362*** –0.330** –0.107 –0.171 –0.235 –0.225
(0.135) (0.154) (0.191) (0.217) (0.191) (0.218)
&\FOLFDO¿VFDOUXOHV 0.056 0.091 0.058 0.067 0.130 0.138













Constant 1.437*** 1.685*** 0.189 0.544** 0.328 0.685*
(0.157) (0.165) (0.333) (0.255) (0.296) (0.366)
Observations 2,943 2,943 437 437 299 299
R-squared 0.164 0.109 0.407 0.382 0.157 0.100
Number of economies 171 171 29 29 26 26
1RWHV+HWHURVNHGDVWLFLW\DQGDXWRFRUUHODWLRQUREXVWVWDQGDUGHUURUVLQSDUHQWKHVHVIRU2/6KHWHURVNHGDVWLFLW\
autocorrelation and cross-sectional dependence robust standard errors in parentheses for PCSE; ***, **, * 
LQGLFDWHVWDWLVWLFDOVLJQL¿FDQFHDWDQGSHUFHQWUHVSHFWLYHO\# denotes variables measured at time t + 1.
6RXUFHAuthors’ calculations.
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Column 1 presents the results for our preferred estimation. Most of the variables’ 
FRHI¿FLHQWVDUHVLJQL¿FDQWDQGWDNHWKHH[SHFWHGVLJQ$RQHSHUFHQWDJHSRLQWLQ-
crease in the (absolute value of the) output gap is associated with a 0.11 percentage 
point increase in its revision. Similarly, real GDP growth surprises positively af-
fect revisions. A one percentage point increase in the deviation of domestic real 
GDP growth from its past 10 years’ mean raises the revision by 0.07 percentage 
points, while a one percentage point increase in the deviation of the world real GDP 
growth from its past 10 years’ mean raises the revision by 0.19 percentage points.
Evidence on the effects of macroeconomic uncertainty on output gap revisions 
LV PL[HG 7KHFRHI¿FLHQW RQ KLVWRULFDO JURZWK YRODWLOLW\ LV LQVLJQL¿FDQW VXJ-
gesting that historically volatile countries are not subject to greater uncertainty 
around output gap estimates. However, estimating output gaps for resource rich 
countries is more challenging, as an increase of one percentage point in rents as 
a share of GDP brings about an increase in the revision by 0.02 percentage points.
&RXQWULHVZLWK LQÀDWLRQ WDUJHWLQJ UHJLPHVKDYH ORZHU RXWSXW JDS UHYLVLRQV




of the revisions. OECD countries have revisions over half a point smaller than 
WKRVHRIRWKHUFRXQWULHVZKLOH/,&VKDYHUHYLVLRQV WKDWDUHDERXWKDOIDSRLQW
larger than other countries. Small countries have even larger revisions — 0.79 per-
centage points greater than the rest of the sample.
6RPHUREXVWQHVVFKHFNVDUHSHUIRUPHGRQWKHSUHIHUUHGVSHFL¿FDWLRQ7KHUHVXOWV
after correcting for cross-sectional dependence of standard errors are very similar, 
suggesting that such dependence is not pervasive in the data (Column 2). Also, 
WKHUHVXOWVZKHQXVLQJ:(2RXWSXWJDSHVWLPDWHV&ROXPQVDQGDQG2(&'




and 1¼ and 4 times larger when OECD data are used. On the other hand, the coef-
¿FLHQWVIRUUHDO*'3JURZWKYRODWLOLW\DQGLQÀDWLRQWDUJHWLQJUHJLPHDUHVLJQL¿FDQW
when OECD data are used and maintain a similar magnitude.
7ZRYDULDEOHVEHFRPHVWDWLVWLFDOO\VLJQL¿FDQWZKHQXVLQJ2(&'RXWSXWJDS
estimates. Rents (as a share of GDP) take a negative sign suggesting that the size 
of the revisions is smaller when the country is resource rich. This (rather coun-
terintuitive) result is mainly driven by the large rents in Norway, Canada, and 
Australia, countries with a high degree of macroeconomic stability. The estima-
tion of a regression including an interaction term between rents and a dummy 
YDULDEOHWDNLQJDYDOXHRIRQHIRUWKHVHWKUHHFRXQWULHV\LHOGVDQRQVLJQL¿FDQW
FRHI¿FLHQWRQUHQWV$OOWKHVHUREXVWQHVVFKHFNVVKRXOGEHWDNHQZLWKFDXWLRQDV
the sample is only a fraction of the one in Column 1. Also, the subset of countries 
used in Columns 3 to 6 may suffer from selection bias because the countries in-





:(2GDWDWKDWDUHJHQHUDWHGE\Ȝ equal to 6.25. The results are very similar to 
the ones reported in Columns 1 and 2 and suggest that the choice of the smooth-
ing parameter does not affect the main conclusions.14 
7KHJRRGQHVVRI¿WRIWKHGLIIHUHQWVSHFL¿FDWLRQVIDOOVLQWKHWRSHUFHQW
range. This suggests that a large component of the revisions behaves as a white 
noise process, and thus, it cannot be explained by factors known to policymakers.
:HDOVRHVWLPDWHWKHEDVHOLQHVSHFL¿FDWLRQZLWKRXWGXPP\YDULDEOHVIRUFRXQ-
try groups. One may argue these dummies pick up effects other than the ones 
they are constructed for and that, as a result, the explanatory power may be 
even lower than in the baseline estimation. The results, however, suggest that 
WKLV LVQRW WKHFDVHDV WKHFRQWLQXRXVYDULDEOHVSUHVHQW VLPLODUFRHI¿FLHQWVDQG
the R-squared is close to the one of the baseline, so the results are not shown. 
In order to reduce the likelihood of omitted variable bias, in Table 5 we present 
VRPHH[WHQVLRQVWRWKHEDVHOLQHVSHFL¿FDWLRQ7KHEDVHOLQHUHVXOWVDUHJHQHUDOO\
robust when other explanatory variables are added. First, we test if adherence to 
GDWDGLVVHPLQDWLRQVWDQGDUGVGH¿QHGE\WKH,0)WKH*HQHUDO'DWD'LVVHPLQDWLRQ




of the destruction of human and physical capital (including assessing the impact 




Also, we control for institutional quality. Corruption or low bureaucratic quali-
ty may negatively affect data quality and data production processes. For example, 
if institutional quality is weak, there may be scope for data manipulation with 
WKHDLPRI REWDLQLQJSROLWLFDO DGYDQWDJH+HQFHZH H[SHFW WKHFRHI¿FLHQWV RQ
ERWKYDULDEOHVWREHQHJDWLYH7KHHVWLPDWLRQ\LHOGVVWDWLVWLFDOO\LQVLJQL¿FDQWFR-
HI¿FLHQWV&ROXPQVDQG
Finally, we introduce information about future GDP growth. In principle, 
a sharp acceleration or slowdown in growth after year t should play a role in 





growth increases the size of the output gap revision by 0.12 percentage points. 
7KHLQFRUSRUDWLRQ RI WKLV YDULDEOH WXUQV WKHFRHI¿FLHQW RQ WKHDEVROXWH VL]H
RI WKHRXWSXW JDS LQVLJQL¿FDQW VXJJHVWLQJ VRPH UHGXQGDQF\ EHWZHHQ WKHWZR
Moreover, the increase in explanatory power is modest (Column 5).16
 14 Results are available from the authors upon request.





6LPLODU WR WKHUREXVWQHVV FKHFN IRU WKHEDVHOLQH VSHFL¿FDWLRQ ZH H[FOXGH
WKHGXPP\YDULDEOHVIRUFRXQWU\JURXSVDQGUHHVWLPDWH&ROXPQVWR:KLOH
WKHFRHI¿FLHQWV IRU WKHFRQWLQXRXV YDULDEOHV VKRZ VLPLODUPDJQLWXGHV EXUHDX-
FUDWLFTXDOLW\DQGFRQWURORIFRUUXSWLRQWXUQVLJQL¿FDQWZLWKWKHH[SHFWHGQHJD-
tive sign, suggesting a fairly high degree of correlation with the excluded dum-
mies (results not shown).
Table 6 shows the marginal effects derived from the probit estimations on 
WKHEDVHOLQHGDWDVHWRI+3¿OWHUHG:(2GDWD&ROXPQSUHVHQWVWKHUHVXOWVXV-
Table 5
Determinants of the absolute revisions of the output gap, extensions  
(dependent variable: absolute revisions of the output gap at t + 7 compared to t+3¿OWHUHGGDWD
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Abs. output gap # 0.109*** 0.109*** 0.108** 0.107** 0.051
(0.035) (0.036) (0.047) (0.046) (0.045)
Abs. real GDP growth 
surprise #
0.074*** 0.074*** 0.081*** 0.081*** 0.065***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013)
Abs. world real GDP growth 
surprise #
0.200** 0.189** 0.164* 0.166* 0.214***
(0.077) (0.077) (0.087) (0.087) (0.076)
Real GDP growth SD # 0.003 0.005 0.029 0.031 –0.023
(0.020) (0.020) (0.027) (0.028) (0.020)
Rents/GDP 0.021*** 0.020*** 0.017** 0.017** 0.015**
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007)
,QÀDWLRQ 0.009 0.010 0.010 0.011* 0.011
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007)
,QÀDWLRQWDUJHWLQJ –0.394*** –0.361*** –0.274* –0.304** –0.344***
(0.150) (0.134) (0.140) (0.136) (0.126)
&\FOLFDO¿VFDOUXOHV 0.048 0.053 0.090 0.115 0.071
(0.172) (0.167) (0.164) (0.166) (0.148)
OECD –0.578*** –0.544*** –0.328* –0.316* –0.549***
(0.156) (0.150) (0.181) (0.182) (0.139)
/,& 0.542** 0.506** 0.482* 0.538** 0.582**















Control of corruption –0.074
(0.059)




Constant 1.458*** 1.441*** 1.484*** 1.494*** 1.327***
(0.170) (0.156) (0.251) (0.218) (0.156)
Observations 2,943 2,943 2,241 2,241 2,942
R-squared 0.165 0.164 0.183 0.183 0.185
Number of economies 171 171 129 129 171
1RWHV$OOHVWLPDWLRQVDUHSHUIRUPHGZLWKSRROHG2/6KHWHURVNHGDVWLFLW\DQGDXWRFRUUHODWLRQUREXVWVWDQGDUG
HUURUVLQSDUHQWKHVHVLQGLFDWHVWDWLVWLFDOVLJQL¿FDQFHDWDQGSHUFHQWUHVSHFWLYHO\# denotes 




in the size of the output gap reduces the probability of a change in the sign of 
WKHRXWSXW JDSE\SHUFHQW7KLV UHVXOW DORQJZLWK WKH¿QGLQJV RI D SRVL-
tive association between an increase in the size of the output gap and the size of 
the revisions) suggests that countries that are far away from the potential output 
are unlikely to have revisions large enough to change the sign of the output gap. 
Also, real GDP growth surprises increase the probability of the output gap chang-
ing sign, but to a smaller extent.
Macroeconomic uncertainty affects the probability of a sign change in the out-
SXW JDS GXULQJ WKHUHYLVLRQ SHULRG EXW WKHVL]H RI WKHFRHI¿FLHQW LV UHODWLYHO\
Table 6
Determinants of the probability of the output gap changing sign  
(dependent variable: binary variable, 1 if output gap changes sign at t  +3¿OWHUHGGDWDPDUJLQDOHIIHFWV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Abs. output gap # –0.071*** –0.071*** –0.071*** –0.087*** –0.086*** –0.065***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Abs. real GDP growth 
surprise #
0.005* 0.005* 0.005* 0.003 0.003 0.008***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Abs. world real GDP 
growth surprise #
0.009 0.012 0.009 0.001 0.003 0.006
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.016) (0.016) (0.014)
Real GDP growth SD # 0.000 –0.000 0.000 0.006 0.006* 0.002
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Rents/GDP –0.000 –0.000 –0.000 –0.001 –0.001 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
,QÀDWLRQ 0.002** 0.002* 0.002** 0.002** 0.002** 0.002**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
,QÀDWLRQWDUJHWLQJ –0.085*** –0.055** –0.085*** –0.077*** –0.081*** –0.085***
(0.026) (0.028) (0.026) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025)
&\FOLFDO¿VFDOUXOHV 0.116* 0.143** 0.116* 0.112* 0.102 0.114*
(0.068) (0.068) (0.068) (0.068) (0.068) (0.067)
OECD –0.135*** –0.131*** –0.135*** –0.102*** –0.141*** –0.133***
(0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.035) (0.031) (0.029)
/,& 0.106*** 0.100*** 0.106*** 0.100** 0.130*** 0.096***
(0.037) (0.037) (0.036) (0.051) (0.049) (0.037)
Small economy 0.050 0.039 0.050 0.065









Control of corruption 0.010
(0.011)




Observations 2,943 2,943 2,943 2,241 2,241 2,942
Number of economies 171 171 171 129 129 171
1RWHV$OOHVWLPDWLRQVDUHSHUIRUPHGZLWKSRROHG3URELW2/6+HWHURVNHGDVWLFLW\DQGDXWRFRUUHODWLRQUREXVW
VWDQGDUGHUURUVLQSDUHQWKHVHVLQGLFDWHVWDWLVWLFDOVLJQL¿FDQFHDWDQGSHUFHQWUHVSHFWLYHO\




E\  SHUFHQW%HLQJ DQ LQÀDWLRQ WDUJHWHU UHGXFHV WKHSUREDELOLW\ RI D VLJQ
FKDQJHE\SHUFHQW,QWHUHVWLQJO\FRXQWULHVZLWKF\FOLFDO¿VFDOUXOHVDUHPRUH
likely to observe changes in the sign of the output gap during the revision period 
by 0.12 percent. 
Statistical capacity matters. Consistent with the results of Tables 4 and 5, being 
an OECD country reduces the probability of a sign change in the output gap by 
SHUFHQWZKLOHEHLQJD/,&LQFUHDVHVLWE\SHUFHQW
&ROXPQVWRUHSRUW WKHUHVXOWVRIH[WHQVLRQVWRWKHEDVHOLQHVSHFL¿FDWLRQ
The baseline regressors are robust, with the exception of real GDP growth sur-
SULVHVZKLFK ORVHV VLJQL¿FDQFHZKHQ WKHLQVWLWXWLRQDO TXDOLW\ YDULDEOHV DUH LQ-
cluded and the dummy for small economies is dropped. Among the additional 
UHJUHVVRUV6''6EXWQRW*''6LVVLJQL¿FDQWDQGWDNHVWKHH[SHFWHGQHJDWLYH
sign. A shift in future GDP growth relative to past GDP growth reduces the prob-
ability of the output gap switching sign. These results are robust to the exclusion 
RIFRXQWU\JURXSGXPPLHVIURPWKHVSHFL¿FDWLRQ
Overall, these regressions predict a low share of the variation in output gap 
revisions. Given that they make use of some information that is not known until 
after the period under analysis, it is reasonable to expect that the predictability 
of output gap revisions ex ante, when it would be useful for policy decisions, is 
even lower.
4. Policy implications
This paper has illustrated the wide range of uncertainty that typically characte-
rizes assessments of the cyclical position of economies around the world. It has 
also shown that only a small share of this uncertainty is likely to be explained 
by factors known to policymakers in real time. This section illustrates some 
SROLF\LPSOLFDWLRQVRI WKHVH¿QGLQJVIRFXVLQJRQ¿YH/DWLQ$PHULFDQHFRQR-
PLHV /$ WKDW KDYH LPSOHPHQWHG DFWLYH FRXQWHUF\FOLFDOPRQHWDU\ SROLFLHV
over the last decade.
4.1. To ease, or to tighten?
The historical output gap data and revisions described above can be used to 
FRQVWUXFWDFRQ¿GHQFHLQWHUYDODURXQGDQ\LQLWLDORUUHYLVHGHVWLPDWHRIWKHRXW-
SXWJDS7KHZLGWKRIWKHFRQ¿GHQFHLQWHUYDOZLOOYDU\E\FRXQWU\GHSHQGLQJRQ
the historical distribution of its output gap revisions. It will also vary by the vin-
WDJHRIUHYLVLRQZLWKDZLGHUFRQ¿GHQFHLQWHUYDOIRUDQLQLWLDOHVWLPDWHWKDQIRU
DUHYLVHGHVWLPDWHWKDWLVFORVHULQWLPHWRWKH¿QDOHVWLPDWH
Fig. 6 shows initial estimates of the output gap for Brazil, Chile, Colombia, 
0H[LFR DQG3HUX IRU ± )LJ  DOVR VKRZV FRQ¿GHQFH LQWHUYDOV FDO-
culated using the distribution of cumulative revisions to initial estimates over 
± 7KHPDJQLWXGH RI WKHFRQ¿GHQFH LQWHUYDOV HQFRPSDVVHV D ZLGH
range of potential outcomes. Only in rare cases is there a high degree of certainty 
about whether policy should be contractionary, neutral, or expansionary; for most 
countries in most years, there is a non-negligible probability that the appropriate 
policy could be in any of those three categories.
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4.2. Setting monetary policy in real time
7KHFRQ¿GHQFHLQWHUYDOVSURYLGHDEURDGYLHZRIKRZXQFHUWDLQWKHF\FOLFDO
position of any economy is, but are based on annual observations, so are less 
applicable for monetary policy decisions that make use of higher-frequency 
data. In this section, we construct real-time quarterly output gap estimates and 
use them to estimate monetary policy reaction functions based on real-time 
data.
7KH/$PHQWLRQHGDERYHDOODGRSWHGLQÀDWLRQWDUJHWLQJDV WKHLUPRQHWDU\
policy framework between 1999 and 2002 (Roger, 2010). Assessing the econo-
P\¶VDFWXDOOHYHORIRXWSXWUHODWLYHWRLWVSRWHQWLDOLVDNH\HOHPHQWRILQÀDWLRQ
targeting. This is because the degree of spare capacity is typically an important 
 
Fig. 6.5HDOWLPHRXWSXWJDSHVWLPDWHVDQGFRQ¿GHQFHLQWHUYDOV 





The output gap is not the only indicator of the degree of spare capacity, but it 
is one of the broadest and is frequently used both in models of monetary policy 
and in policy decisions. Alternative indicators such as the unemployment rate 
can also be useful but have other shortcomings, including being dependent on 
labor participation rates, which can change over time. Combinations of variables 
may outperform any individual variable, but for each indicator of spare capacity 
the fundamental challenge is the same as for the output gap — decomposing ob-
served data into its cyclical and trend components. Thus, while central banks ana-
lyze a wide variety of indicators in assessing the cyclical position of an economy, 
this section uses the output gap to summarize economy-wide spare capacity and 
illustrates the implications of output gap revisions for the appropriate settings of 
monetary policy.17
$QLQÀDWLRQWDUJHWLQJFHQWUDOEDQNVHWVSROLF\VRDVWRPLQLPL]HWKHGHYLDWLRQ
RIDFWXDOLQÀDWLRQʌt from the target ʌ*, as in the following loss (Ȗ) function:
Ȗ = Var (ʌt  –  ʌ*) (4)
Since monetary policy affects economic activity with a lag and activity af-
fects prices with a lag, the policy instrument rt — which in the countries analyzed 
here is the rate at which the central bank makes short-term loans to commercial 
banks — is set with respect to the expected value at time t of the deviation of 
IXWXUHLQÀDWLRQDWWLPHt + i ) from the target (ʌt+i _t  –  ʌ*) given the current infor-
mation set:
rt = f {E(ʌt+i _t  –  ʌ*)} (5)
&RQFHSWXDOO\DQ\LQIRUPDWLRQWKDWFRXOGKHOSSUHGLFWIXWXUHLQÀDWLRQZRXOG
have a place in the central bank’s reaction function. This could potentially in-
clude a wide array of variables or non-quantitative information (for example, 
RQSURVSHFWLYHKDUYHVWV RI NH\ DJULFXOWXUDO SURGXFWV ,QSUDFWLFH WKHLQÀDWLRQ
expectations of market participants should account for all publicly-available in-
IRUPDWLRQUHOHYDQWWRLQÀDWLRQDWDJLYHQSRLQWLQWLPHDQGFRXOGWKXVVHUYHDV
a proxy. Given this paper’s interest in the impact of domestic capacity utilization 
RQLQÀDWLRQWKHRXWSXWJDS\Ǧ t ) is included separately.18 Thus, the central bank’s 
reaction function can be modeled as:
rt = f {(ʌ mt+i _t  –  ʌ*),  \Ǧ t } (6)
where ʌ mt+i _t UHSUHVHQWV WKHLQÀDWLRQ H[SHFWDWLRQV RI PDUNHW SDUWLFLSDQWV DW
the horizon relevant for monetary policy. Expectational channels are typically 
VWURQJLQLQÀDWLRQWDUJHWLQJUHJLPHVEHFDXVHRIWKHIRUZDUGORRNLQJQDWXUHRI
 17 The output gap is also an indicator for which forecasts tend to be more readily available. This permits 
estimation of the cyclical and trend components over both historical and forecast data points, thus mitigating 
WKHHQGSRLQWSUREOHPIRXQGLQPRVW¿OWHULQJPHWKRGV
 18 This will directly capture the central bank’s response to the output gap, implicitly incorporating the central 
EDQN¶VH[SHFWDWLRQRIWKHLPSDFWRIWKHRXWSXWJDSRQLQÀDWLRQ
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policy, which advocates the use of the lagged policy rate in empirical esti-
PDWLRQ:RRGIRUG2USKDQLGHV7KHHVWLPDWHGUHDFWLRQIXQFWLRQ
is then:
rt = ȡUt –1  +  (1  –  ȡ)(Į0  +  Įʌ ʌt+i _t  +  Į\Ǧ  \Ǧ t –1)  +  Șt (7)
The persistence parameter on the lagged monetary policy rate is ȡ, Įʌ and Į\Ǧ 
DUHWKHUHVSRQVHVRIPRQHWDU\SROLF\WRH[SHFWHGLQÀDWLRQDQGWKHRXWSXWJDS
respectively, and Șt is the error term. The expected future output gap is not in-
FOXGHG EHFDXVH WKHWUDQVPLVVLRQ ODJ IURP WKHRXWSXW JDS WR LQÀDWLRQ LPSOLHV
WKDWWKHFXUUHQWRUODJJHGRXWSXWJDSLVPRUHUHOHYDQWIRUIXWXUHLQÀDWLRQKHUH
WKH¿UVW ODJ LVXVHGVLQFH WKHLQLWLDO HVWLPDWHEDVHGRQDFWXDOGDWD LVDYDLODEOH
by the end of the following quarter. However, given the method for estimating 
the output gap described below, even the lagged output gap embodies informa-
tion on the expectations of market participants concerning output growth in sub-




on real GDP was merged with the real GDP growth expectations data to form 
DVHULHVH[WHQGLQJEHWZHHQ¿YHDQGHLJKWTXDUWHUVEH\RQGWKHHQGSRLQWRIDFWXDO
GDWDDWDQ\JLYHQSRLQWLQWLPH7KLVH[WHQGHGVHULHVLVWKHQ¿OWHUHGDQGWKHRXW-
put gap calculated for the last available data point.
Fig. 7 compares the real-time series with the one resulting from data available 
up to the second quarter of 2014. Note that differences in recent periods tend to 
be smaller, since actual data has not gone through as many revisions, and there 
have been fewer subsequent periods providing new information on the decompo-
sition of actual data into its structural and trend components. 
Nevertheless, there are some substantial differences. For Brazil, the latest esti-
mate suggests that the economy was operating at a higher rate of capacity utiliza-
tion from 2010 to 2012 than given by initial estimates. Initial estimates of output 
relative to potential were also revised up substantially in Chile and Mexico from 
2006 to 2008 and Colombia in 2008. Initial estimates for Peru signaled that out-
SXWZDVDERYHSRWHQWLDOIURPWRD¿QGLQJWKDWZDVODWHUUHYHUVHGDV
potential output was subsequently revised upward.
4.3. Monetary reaction functions
In order to evaluate the robustness of such real-time output gap estimates as in-
puts to monetary policy decisions, we estimate policy reaction functions as in (7). 
For each country these reaction functions use the real-time output gap estimated 
DERYHDQGWKHLQÀDWLRQH[SHFWDWLRQVRIPDUNHWSDUWLFLSDQWVVXUYH\HGE\ WKHUH-
spective central banks. The monetary policy rate is measured as the end-quar-
ter rate; thus, it should take into account all information available as of the last 
month of the quarter, including real GDP data for the previous quarter, plus ex-
SHFWHGLQÀDWLRQDQGUHDO*'3JURZWKLQWKHFHQWUDOEDQNVXUYH\IURPWKDWPRQWK
Estimation begins in 2005, coinciding with the availability of real-time GDP data 
IRUWKH/$FRXQWULHV
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Table 7 shows the estimated monetary policy reaction functions. Since the data 
XVHG LV DYDLODEOH LQ UHDO WLPH WKHHVWLPDWLRQ LV SHUIRUPHG XVLQJ 2/6 VHH
Orphanides, 2001).19 In all cases, the central bank reacts strongly to increases 
LQ LQÀDWLRQH[SHFWDWLRQV DQG WKHUHVSRQVH LV VWDWLVWLFDOO\ VLJQL¿FDQWH[FHSW IRU
Brazil. A response greater than one implies that the reaction function would have 
UHTXLUHGDQLQFUHDVHLQUHDOLQWHUHVWUDWHVZKHQDQLQFUHDVHLQLQÀDWLRQZDVH[-




(output gap in percent of potential GDP).
6RXUFHVNational authorities; and authors’calculations.
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pected, which is a necessary condition for maintaining price stability. These re-
action functions also imply that increases in the output gap would be countered 
by raising interest rates (Į\Ǧ LVSRVLWLYHDQGVWDWLVWLFDOO\VLJQL¿FDQWLQDOOFDVHV
These characteristics of the reaction functions are generally in line with characte-
UL]DWLRQVRIWKHSROLFLHVRIWKH/$FHQWUDOEDQNVGXULQJWKLVSHULRGDVSROLF\
interest rates were adjusted in a countercyclical manner and expectations were 
JHQHUDOO\ZHOODQFKRUHG2YHUDOOWKHIXQFWLRQVSURYLGHDFORVH¿WWRDFWXDOSROLF\
interest rates over 2005–2014. 
4.4. Output gap revisions and policy revisions
The monetary policy reaction functions estimated above can be combined 
with revised real GDP data to calculate the extent to which the policy prescrip-
tions formulated in real time would deviate from the ideal policy calculated ex 
post using revised data. The ideal policy calculated ex post could not have been 
implemented in real time since the data informing the policy were not avail-
able. The purpose of the calculation is to demonstrate the potential inaccuracy of 
policy prescriptions relying heavily on an estimated output gap that is susceptible 
to large revisions.
)LJXVHVWKHFRHI¿FLHQWVRQWKHRXWSXWJDSHVWLPDWHGLQ7DEOHWRFDOFXODWH
the deviation in the prescribed policy owing to output gap revisions. The devia-
tion is calculated as the actual policy interest rate minus the rate that would have 
EHHQSUHVFULEHGXVLQJ WKHFRHI¿FLHQWV LQ7DEOH DQG WKHHVWLPDWHGRXWSXWJDS
calculated using real GDP data and expectations available through the second 
quarter of 2014. A positive (negative) value thus implies that actual policy was 
tighter (looser) than revised data would recommend.
Following directly from the magnitude of output gap revisions presented in 
earlier sections, the deviations in policy prescriptions generated by these revi-
sions are substantial. Deviations of over 100 basis points occur in multiple epi-
sodes across all countries. Some episodes are short-lived, but there are several 
LQVWDQFHVLQZKLFKWKHVHGHYLDWLRQVODVWIRURYHUD\HDUUHÀHFWLQJWKHWHQGHQF\IRU
output gap revisions to display a high degree of persistence. 
Table 7
Monetary policy reaction functions (dependent variable: monetary policy rate).
Brazil Chile Colombia Mexico Peru
Į0 4.72 4.59** 2.52** 1.94** 2.91**
(3.78) (0.24) (0.58) (0.88) (0.98)
Įʌ 1.16 3.04** 3.18* 2.51** 1.56**
(0.7) (0.38) (1.63) (0.96) (0.49)
Į\Ǧ 1.89** 0.96** 0.74** 0.43** 0.88*
(0.71) (0.18) (0.33) (0.14) (0.47)
ȡ 0.82** 0.77** 0.73** 0.66** 0.85**
(0.04) (0.04) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07)
Adjusted r-squared 0.94 0.97 0.95 0.98 0.90
Standard error of 
the regression
0.77 0.34 0.52 0.30 0.40




Revisions to policy prescriptions based on economic conditions in the current 
quarter are substantial, but a central bank may react to broad trends in economic 
activity spanning multiple periods. Averaging across periods may help to reduce 
the noise-to-signal ratio in the data. To evaluate whether this kind of policy rule 
would generate policy prescriptions that are less susceptible to revision, we es-
timate reaction functions using a three-quarter moving average of the output 
gap and calculate the deviations in policy prescriptions owing to output gap re-
visions.20 The results are not shown since the deviations were quite similar in 
magnitude to those in Fig. 7, only displaying more persistence. This is in line with 
the behavior of the smoothed output gaps, whose revisions are more persistent 
but similar in magnitude to the non-smoothed gaps. 
 20 In this rule, the central bank responds to an average of the output gap in the previous two quarters and 
market expectations of the output gap in the current quarter.
 
Fig. 8. Policy deviations owing to output gap revisions 




The previous section showed that prescriptions from policy rules relying on the out - 
SXWJDSDUHVXEMHFWWRVXEVWDQWLDOUHYLVLRQV+RZHYHUXQGHULQÀDWLRQWDUJHWLQJWKHVH
UHYLVLRQVRQO\SRVHDSUREOHPWRWKHH[WHQWWKDWWKH\FRQWDLQLQIRUPDWLRQDERXWLQÀD-
tion that is not otherwise accounted for in the central bank’s actual policy decisions. 
,IRXWSXWJDSUHYLVLRQVDUHQRWUHODWHGWRGHYLDWLRQVRILQÀDWLRQIURPWKHWDUJHW








using equations of the following form: 
ʌt = Į  +  Ȉ4i = 0   ȕi \Ǧ i  +  İ (8)
where \Ǧ i is either the initial estimate of the output gap or the revision. It has al-
ready been established that initial estimates of the output gap tend to be mea-
sured with error. In regressions using the initial estimates, this measurement error 
would bias the ȕiFRHI¿FLHQWVLQHTXDWLRQWRZDUG]HUR
*LYHQ WUDQVPLVVLRQ ODJV IURP WKHRXWSXW JDS WR LQÀDWLRQ ZH LQFOXGH IRXU
ODJV:HUXQDVHSDUDWHVHWRIUHJUHVVLRQVZLWKRXWWKHFRQWHPSRUDQHRXVWHUPIRU
WKHRXWSXWJDSWRHQVXUHWKDWVLPXOWDQHLW\EHWZHHQRXWSXWDQGLQÀDWLRQRZLQJWR
supply shocks, for example) does not drive the results.
Given the persistence of estimated output gaps and their revisions, the question 
RILQWHUHVWLVZKHWKHUWKHRXWSXWJDSWHUPVLQHTXDWLRQDUHMRLQWO\VLJQL¿FDQW
IRULQÀDWLRQ:HSHUIRUP:DOGF-tests (robust to heteroskedasticity and autocor-
UHODWLRQWRPHDVXUHWKHMRLQWVLJQL¿FDQFHRIWKHRXWSXWJDSWHUPVLQWKHHTXDWLRQ
Table 8 shows the results of the F-WHVWV DQG XQGHUOLQHV WZR NH\ ¿QGLQJV
i) Initial estimates of the output gap are measured with such error that other than 
LQ&RORPELDWKH\DUHQRWLQIRUPDWLYHDERXWWKHIXWXUHGLUHFWLRQRILQÀDWLRQDQG
LL2XWSXWJDSUHYLVLRQVDUHKLJKO\LQIRUPDWLYHDERXWIXWXUHLQÀDWLRQLQDOOFRXQ-
tries.217KH\H[SODLQ WRSHUFHQWRI WKHYDULDWLRQ LQ LQÀDWLRQRQDYHUDJH
([FOXVLRQRI WKHFRQWHPSRUDQHRXVRXWSXWJDS WHUPRUXVHRIFRUH LQÀDWLRQ LQ-
VWHDGRIKHDGOLQHLQÀDWLRQGRHVQRWRYHUWXUQWKHVHUHVXOWV
7KHVH¿QGLQJVVXJJHVW WKDWQRLV\ LQLWLDOHVWLPDWHVRI WKHRXWSXWJDSVXUURXQG
with uncertainty the formulation of appropriate countercyclical monetary policy. 
7KH\DOVRVKRZWKDWLQIRUPDWLRQWKDWLVLPSRUWDQWIRULQÀDWLRQLVQRWWDNHQDFFRXQW
in real time, precisely because the level of economic activity relative to its potential 
is not known with much certainty until long after policy decisions have been made. 
This underscores a key weakness of monetary policy decisions relying on real-time 
assessments of the cyclical position of the economy, especially in emerging econo-
mies where there are greater challenges in distinguishing between trend and cycle. 
 21 7KH¿QGLQJVDUHWKHVDPHZKHQXVLQJWKH¿QDOHVWLPDWHRIWKHRXWSXWJDSUDWKHUWKDQMXVWWKHUHYLVLRQ
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5. Summary and conclusions
This paper illustrates the wide range of uncertainty that is often associated 
with country desks’ and market participants’ output gap assessments, which high-
OLJKWV WKHLU ORZUHOLDELOLW\ IRUSROLF\ UHFRPPHQGDWLRQV:H¿QG WKDW LQLWLDODV-
sessments of an economy’s cyclical position overestimate the amount of slack 
in the economy, and that revisions are persistent, especially during recessions. 
The paper also shows that only a small share of this uncertainty can be explained 
by factors known to policymakers in real time, and that trying to explain whether 
the initial estimate of the output gap will change sign is equally challenging. In 
SDUWLFXODUZH¿QGWKDWRXWSXWJDSUHYLVLRQVDUHSRVLWLYHO\DVVRFLDWHGZLWKWKHDE-
solute value of the initial estimate of the output gap, and similarly, that real GDP 
growth surprises tend to make subsequent output gap revisions larger. Evidence 
on the effects of macroeconomic uncertainty on output gap revisions is mixed, 
ZKLOHTXDOLW\RIGDWDLVDVWDWLVWLFDOO\VLJQL¿FDQWGHWHUPLQDQWRIWKHUHYLVLRQV,Q
DGGLWLRQFRXQWULHVZLWKLQÀDWLRQWDUJHWLQJUHJLPHVKDYHORZHURXWSXWJDSUHYL-
sions, possibly owing to a more countercyclical monetary policy which results in 
a smaller output gap.
2XWSXWJDSGDWDDQGUHYLVLRQVFDQEHXVHG WRFRQVWUXFWFRQ¿GHQFH LQWHUYDOV
DURXQGDQ\ LQLWLDORU UHYLVHGRXWSXWJDSHVWLPDWH7KHZLGWKRI WKHFRQ¿GHQFH
interval will vary by country, and by the vintage of the revision, with a wider con-
¿GHQFHLQWHUYDOIRUDQLQLWLDOHVWLPDWHWKDQIRUDUHYLVHGHVWLPDWH:H¿QGWKDWDW
WKHWLPHRIWKHLQLWLDOHVWLPDWHFRQ¿GHQFHLQWHUYDOVDUHXVXDOO\VRODUJHDVWRVSDQ
positive and negative values for the output gap. In other words, only in rare cases 
is there a high degree of certainty about whether policy should be contractionary, 
neutral, or expansionary. These results underscore the challenges policymakers 
face when making policy decisions that require an assessment of the economy’s 
cyclical position.
The paper analyzes the implications of output gap uncertainty in the case of 
¿YH/DWLQ$PHULFDQHFRQRPLHV%UD]LO&KLOH&RORPELD0H[LFRDQG3HUXWKDW
DGRSWHGLQÀDWLRQWDUJHWLQJDVWKHLUPRQHWDU\SROLF\IUDPHZRUNEHWZHHQDQG
2002. Assessing the economy’s actual level of output relative to its potential is 





Initial estimate of the output gap Revision to output gap
Headline Core Headline Core
/DJV /DJV /DJV /DJV /DJV /DJV /DJV /DJV
Brazil **         ** *
Chile **         ** **         **
Colombia **         ** ** ** **         ** **          *
Mexico * **         ** **         **





functions using revised (more accurate) real output gap estimates result, in many 
cases, in policy prescriptions that are substantially different than those prescribed 
using initial estimates of the output gap. In addition, revised estimates of the out-
SXWJDSDUHSRVLWLYHO\DQGVLJQL¿FDQWO\FRUUHODWHGZLWKLQÀDWLRQVXJJHVWLQJWKDW
this information is not accounted for in real-time policy decisions.
7KHVH¿QGLQJVVXJJHVW WKDW LQIRUPDWLRQWKDW LV LPSRUWDQWIRU LQÀDWLRQLVQRW
taken into account by central banks in their policy decisions. This occurs, at 
least in part, because the level of economic activity with respect to its potential 
is not known with much certainty until long after policy decisions have been 
PDGH7KHGLI¿FXOW\ LQ GLVWLQJXLVKLQJ EHWZHHQ F\FOLFDO ÀXFWXDWLRQV DQG VKLIWV
in the trend rate of growth underscores a key weakness of monetary policy rules 
relying on real-time assessments of the cyclical position of the economy, even 
when policymakers consult a large set of indicators.
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